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PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND THE ROYALTY OWNER:
A MISAPPLIED DOCTRINE
by
Robert 0. Lewers*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE ROYALTY OWNER AND THE LAW

T

HE FALLOUT from the decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin1 by the Supreme Court in 1954 (sometimes referred to herein as Phillips I) holding that the independent producer who transports or
sells oil or gas in interstate commerce is subject to the Natural Gas Act,'
continues to plague the oil and gas industry. The area pricing method,
established as a result of that decision, for controlling the price at which
natural gas is sold by the producer has, in recent years, come in conflict
with claims of royalty owners who assert that they are entitled to their
royalty share on the basis of the current contemporary market price of
gas. This price is generally somewhat higher than that established by the
Commission under the area pricing approach. This claim raises the legal
question of whether royalty gas is subject to the Natural Gas Act, as is
the working interest gas. The problem has not been helped by the position of the Federal Power Commission which, historically, has not attempted to exercise jurisdiction over royalty gas. In recent litigation the
courts have attempted to approach the solution to the problem by employing the primary jurisdiction doctrine, disregarding the possibility that
if jurisdiction exists at all, it is exclusive jurisdiction under the Natural
Gas Act as enacted by Congress.
This Article will examine the principles of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, as well as the "exclusive jurisdiction" principles. Their applicability to the question of jurisdiction over gas royalty payments by
the Federal Power Commission will be considered, together with the
Natural Gas Act. A review of the pertinent cases will be included, with
particular emphasis on the effect of primary and exclusive jurisdiction
doctrines on gas royalty payments. The Article will close with a summary
of conclusions drawn, and an analysis of what the correct law ought to be
on the question of jurisdiction. It should be recognized that some of the
problems here discussed are of far reaching significance and that the applicable basic law is only now being established. Accordingly, this Article
should be viewed as an analysis of the legal treatment and implications of
a controversy of relatively recent origin. Essentially it is a controversy
which arose from the payment of royalty by producers on the basis of
gas sales contract prices rather than on the basis of current contemporary
"market price," a basis desired by the royalty owners.
* LL.B., Westminster School of Law, Denver, Colorado; LL.M., Southern Methodist University.
Senior Attorney, Sun Oil Company, Dallas, Texas.
'347 U.S. 672 (1954).
IS U.S.C. §5 717-717w (1964).
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A. Usual Production and Marketing Practicesfor Natural Gas
In the analysis of the rights of the royalty owner to payment of his
share of gas production based on "market value" as specified in the lease,

a review of the usual and customary industry practices involved in the
production and marketing of natural gas from the standpoint of the

lessor and the lessee is necessary.
The basic approach must be the realization that "gas" is not an interchangeable word with "oil" and that physical differences between the two
substances require different treatment in the lease itself. Both substances
have a common origin, are frequently associated in a common reservoir,
and are often produced from a common well bore and used as fuel by

the ultimate consumer. A major difference between "oil" which commonly exists as a liquid at normal atmospheric pressures and temperatures and
"gas," is the relative facility with which liquids may be stored, packaged,
transported and marketed in comparison with gases. To date, no practical
method has been devised for the economical storage of gas in large volumes above ground. Only by pipeline can natural gas be successfully
transported overland to distance markets.'
Once the discovery of gas has been made, it is incumbent on the producer to obtain a market for it as early as reasonably possible. The proximity of an existing pipeline system or processing plant near the producer's outlet will be a key factor in the timing of the sale and delivery
of gas to a buyer. When the buyer owns a pipeline system or a plant
facility located near the producer's outlet, the buyer may contract to
make connection within a short period of time, governed by the distance
the buyer's lines must be extended, the availability of pipe, acquisition
of rights of way needed, and the buyer's capacity and requirements for
a market. The producer's lease expiration or marketing obligations may
well be reflected in the time allowed for connection. If no possible market
is presently available the typical standard lease form will authorize the
lessee to continue the lease by the payment of a specified sum or an
amount equal to the annual delay rental, generally payable either at the
end of the shut-in year or within a specified period of days after the well
has been shut-in.
Under the usual lease royalty provision the contract selling price of
the gas provided the proper basis for royalty payments, not so much because it was the actual selling price, but rather because the contract selling price also happened to represent the "market price" of the gas at the
time the gas reserves under the lease were committed to a long-term
sales contract. Stated otherwise, the price was not tied to each day's delivery of gas based on the "daily market value," with a separate sale taking place daily or whenever a new and independent "market price" occurred. From a practical standpoint, it has never been feasible for gas
producers to conduct business with gas sales based on a price which may
a It should also be pointed out that the very nature of gas usually prevents it from being taken
in kind as royalty by the lessor as in the case of oil, other than as fuel for domestic or irrigation
uses.
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fluctuate at frequent intervals, or with sales which are subject to a "daily
sales price" or "daily price quotation," varying from day to day.
While many of the earliest gas sales contracts were for a term coexistent
with "the life of the lease," it later became common for gas sales contracts to be in effect for a fixed term of twenty years or more. Understandably a transmission company that purchased gas had to be assured
of a long-term supply before it could risk the capital expenditure required to build a pipeline. The buyer, therefore, generally required a contract which would extend for at least twenty years.
Since the lessee is under an implied obligation to market, it had never
been seriously questioned, until recently, that so long as he uses reasonable
diligence in securing the best sales contract possible, his obligation to
the lessor is fulfilled if the lessor receives one-eighth (or other lease royalty fraction) of the proceeds derived from such contract.
The early form of lease royalty clause to which much of the present
trouble can be attributed with respect to "market price" simply provided
that: "In consideration of the premises the said lessee covenants and
agrees: ...

2nd. To pay to lessor, as royalty for gas from each well where

gas only is found, while the same is being sold or used off of the premises,
one-eighth of the market price at the wells of the amount so sold or
used . ..

."

This language has, in recent years, been expanded to provide that the
lessor is entitled to one-eighth (or some other specified fraction) of the
"market value" of the gas at the well where the gas is sold or used off
the lease premises, provided that on gas sold at the wells the royalty
will be one-eighth of the amount realized from the sale.
B. The Controversy over "Market Price"

Over a period of many years the petroleum industry uniformly conducted its business of selling gas on the premise that the point in time
at which "market price" was established for the purpose of royalty payments was, in the case of a prudent long-term gas sale, when the gas
was committed, disposed of and dedicated to sale by virtue of the longterm contract. The value was not based on the market price in effect

when the gas was delivered with a price determined and redetermined
periodically in accordance with contemporary prices paid in other gas
sales.
A recent controversy over determination of market price has arisen in

significant litigation occurring in the state courts of Texas, as well as in
the federal courts. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela,4 involving the construction of the gas royalty clause of an old oil and gas lease, has recently
been decided by the Supreme Court of Texas in favor of the royalty
owners. In Vela the royalty owners sought to recover alleged deficiencies
in royalty payments from their lessee, as well as cancellation of the lease
for breach of the implied covenant to develop. The lease, granted in
4 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).
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1933, covered some 1500 acres in Zapata County, Texas, and provided
as a gas royalty, one-eighth of the market price at the wells of the amount
so sold or used.
The primary issue in the case was just what was the "market price" at
the wells. The gas purchase contract, constituting an intrastate sale, was
entered into in 1935 and was to continue in force for the life of the lease.
The trial court held that the "market price" upon which the lessee was
obligated to pay royalty was the current prevailing price in the field. This
was affirmed by the court of civil appeals? which held that the lessors
were not parties to the gas sales agreement and its terms did not change
the lessee's obligation under the lease to pay the "market price."
Some fifteen months after the granting of writ of error, the Supreme
Court of Texas in a five-to-four ruling handed down its decision, affirming the lower courts' holding in the controversy. The court, pointing to
the stipulation in the royalty clause that the lessee would pay one-eighth
of the market price at the well of all gas sold or used off the premises,
said: "This clearly means the prevailing market price at the time of the
sale or use. The gas which was marketed under the long-term contracts
in this case was not 'being sold' at the time the contracts were made

but at the time of the delivery to the purchaser."'

The Vela court agreeing with the court of civil appeals, that the contract price, together with the circumstances of the contract and evidence
of comparable sales, should all be considered to determine market price,'
stated "that the contract price for which the gas was sold by the lessee is
not necessarily the market price within the meaning of the lease." 8 In
this connection the parties had agreed earlier that market price is to be

determined by sales of gas comparable in time, quality and availability of
marketing outlets.
In response to the argument that the lease obligation may prove financially burdensome to a lessee who had made a long-term contract
without protecting himself against increases in market price, Justice
Walker, writing for the majority, expressed his general agreement with
the conclusions in Foster v. Atlantic Refining Co.,' that regardless of the
hardships, the lessee is bound, not only by the obligations imposed by his
lease contract, but to the calculated risk he took that the gas purchase
contract would produce royalties satisfactory to the terms of the lease.'
It is ironic that the court in Vela, not only relied on the Foster case,
but proceeded to extend the holding in Foster, in deciding that "market
price" is to be determined as of the date of delivery of the gas. Foster, on
the other hand, held that "market price" is to be determined as of the
time of delivery of gas from the well to the pipeline, because of the peculiar language of the royalty clause in that case which provided for royal'Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 405 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
8429 S.W.2d at 871 (emphasis added), citing Martin v. Amis, 288 S.W. 431, 433
Comm'n App. 1926).
7405 S.W.2d at 74.
8429 S.W.2d at 871.

9329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964).
'0429 S.W.2d at 871.

(Tex.
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ty payment "at the market price therefor prevailing for the field where
produced when run . .

"" But it is now established in Texas that under

the usual gas sales contract the gas is not being sold at the time the contract is made but at the time the gas is delivered to the purchaser. It
necessarily follows, therefore, that the "market price" mentioned in the
lease must be determined as of the date of delivery of the gas, under the
form of royalty clause in question.
The decision in Vela was, in the eyes of the petroleum industry, a drastic departure from the accepted concept of "market price" as it existed
prior to the decision. From the lessee's standpoint, a decision such as this
leaves him in a position where he is obliged by the implied covenants in
the lease, if not by actual time limitations, to market the gas if it is reasonably possible to do so. He must enter into a long-term contract in
order to make any sale. The royalty owners in turn enjoy the benefit of
the sale year after year, so long as the price is satisfactory. However, if
the price of the gas in the area increases the lessee is compelled to settle
with the royalty owners on the basis of an ever-increasing price while
his realization from the contract remains fixed.
Contemporaneously with the litigation over "market price" of gas
royalty in the state courts of Texas, another royalty problem was developing in the gas industry in connection with sales subject to jurisdiction
of the Federal Power Commission. Newspaper press reports of October
25, 1966,12 indicated the response of some segments of the industry to

this situation. These reports announced that one of the largest natural
gas producers was urging the Federal Power Commission to assume jurisdiction over the payment of royalties on natural gas production subject to FPC control." This development was most startling in the face of
the preceding twelve years of struggle between natural gas producers and
the Commission over gas regulation. If successful, the effect would be to
extend federal regulation under the Natural Gas Act to a previously unregulated area.
The pleas of Mobil Oil Corporation, the producer affected, resulted
from some 283 individual lawsuits filed by royalty owners against it in
the state district courts in Kansas," seeking larger amounts allegedly due
for certain past periods on the theory that royalty settlements should be
based on current or contemporary "market value" or "market price."
The plaintiffs contended that they, as royalty owners, were entitled to
receive payments based on market value-a price above that which the
FPC allowed Mobil to sell the gas. The company, attempting to explain
its unprecedented resort to a federal agency it strives to avoid where possible, pointed out that it was involved with several hundred royalty
owners in the Hugoton gas field over the amounts to be paid by it and
stated that these state court actions left it no other course. So long as the
FPC fixes prices producers receive, Mobil asserted, by abrogating price
11 329 F.2d at 489 (emphasis added).
12Wall Street Journal, Oct. 25, 1966, at 13, col. 3.
" Mobil Oil Corp. v. Matzen, No. R167-114 (F.P.C., filed Oct. 24, 1966).
14E.g., Matzen v. Mobil Oil Co., No. 4692 (D. Kan., filed June 12, 1965).
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provisions of their contracts, producers' positions will be inequitable and

untenable unless the price received by royalty owners is limited by similar action."
Meanwhile, in the Panhandle Field of Texas, litigation had occurred
before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals involving, in two separate
cases, J. M. Huber Corp. v. Denman" and Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co.," suits for amounts alleged to be due for failure of the
lessee to pay as royalty for the gas produced, the "market value" of
lessors' one-eighth share of production. In each instance the court stayed
further proceedings pending a determination by the Federal Power Commission as to its jurisdiction of the accountings for lease royalties where
the reserves represented were being delivered interstate. If jurisdiction
were claimed, it was indicated that the Commission should rule on the extent of implementation which it deemed necessary or appropriate. Both
decisions posed this problem in terms of "primary Federal Power Commission jurisdiction" over royalty payments and reached the same conclusion. The only apparent difference between the cases in regard to this
matter of jurisdiction was that in Denman the lessee was the producer
while in Weymouth the lessee was also an interstate pipeline company
which delivered the royalty gas directly into an interstate system, without the intervening ownership of an independent lessee.
Subsequent to the Fifth Circuit decision in these two cases the Federal
Power Commission on July 23, 1969 issued its opinion 8 asserting jurisdiction over royalty owners' interests in natural gas sold for resale in interstate commerce. In doing so the Commission emphasized, however, that
such jurisdiction could be implemented without undue additional administrative burdens on parties so affected or the Commission. This opinion will be discussed further in this Article.
II.

THE NATURAL GAS ACT AND THE ROYALTY OWNER

A. Purpose of the Natural Gas Act
In considering the "market price" controversy in the face of price
ceiling limitations resulting from federal regulation of natural gas, it is
necessary to examine the background and proclaimed purpose of the

Natural Gas Act.
In its persuasive 1936 Final Report," the Federal Trade Commission
reached the conclusion that prices charged local distributing companies
for natural gas were excessive. It recommended regulation of such sales
where the states could not regulate because of constitutional barriers." °
Thus the legislation proposed in Congress was of a complementary nature,
designed essentially to regulate the segment from the interstate pipeline
"OIL & GAS JOURNAL, Oct. 31, 1966, at 38, col. 2.
16 367 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1966).
17 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966).
'"Denman v. J. H. Huber Corp., No. RI 67-113 (F.P.C. Opinion No. 562, July 23,
"F.T.C. Final Report, S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 84.A (1936).
"Id. at 609, 616.
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to the local distributor where, for constitutional reasons, state regulation
was not possible.2 Fundamentally, the Natural Gas Act was designed
solely to cover those companies engaged in the transportation of natural
gas in interstate commerce and their sales in interstate commerce for resale.2" Thus, from the standpoint of its structure, it is truly a restricted
or limited statute, regulating natural gas companies who, by definition,
are persons engaged in these activities."
It is also evident from the legislative history that the overriding congressional purpose of this statute was to plug the "gap" in regulation of
natural gas companies, which resulted from judicial decisions prohibiting state regulation of many interstate aspects of the gas business." It
was never intended to regulate the entire natural gas field to the limit of
federal constitutional power, but only that portion which the states could
not handle because of the commerce clause of the Constitution.2
Actual judicial experience under the Natural Gas Act has been at variance with this avowed legislative intent. It has been contended that the
limited statutory scope of the Act has been subordinated to the practice
of maximizing FPC control of the natural gas industry by means of judicial interpretations which are policy-oriented rather than law-oriented."
Expansion of FPC jurisdiction well beyond its intended limited function
has resulted from these decisions. Two writers have pointed out, after
reviewing a series of leading natural gas cases, that it is the Court's
method "to read the act literally, with so superficial an inquiry into
its legislative history as to amount to no inquiry at all."'" As federal control became progessively tighter in the regulation of natural gas, it was
inevitable that the royalty owner was destined to become involved in
the Commission scheme of regulatory practices.

B. Position of the Royalty Owner Under State Law
Under the typical lease royalty clause the royalty owner is paid in
cash for his share of the proceeds representing the royalty interest. He
does not have the right to take his royalty gas in kind, nor does he have
any gas to sell since this right was transferred when the lease was granted.
This is true under the non-ownership concept as well as in jurisdictions
following the ownership-in-place doctrine. Texas follows the latter, hold2 "This bill takes no authority from State Commissions, and is so drawn as to complement and
in no manner usurp State regulatory authority." H.R. REP. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1937).

" "Three things and three only Congress drew within its own regulatory power, delegated by
the Act to its agent, the Federal Power Commission. These were: (1) the transportation of natural
gas in interstate commerce;

(2)

its sale in

interstate commerce for resale;

(3)

natural gas com-

panies engaged in such transportation or sale." Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
332 U.S. 507, 516 (1947).
2" 15 U.S.C. § 717a(6) (1964).

I].

21 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954)

[hereinafter referred to as Phillips

"FPC v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 498 (1949).
26 See Flittie & Armour, The Natural Gas Act Experience-A Study in Regulatory Aggression
and Congressional Failure To Control the Legislative Process, 19 Sw. L.J. 448 (1965), for a comprehensive study of the history of the Natural Gas Act, and experience under it.
'1 Id. at 470.
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ing that the execution and delivery of an oil and gas lease constitutes a
sale by the owner, at that time, of a determinable fee to the oil and gas
then in place.2" Under non-ownership concepts, neither the lessor nor the
lessee has title to any of the gas, as a matter of local law, until such time
as it has been produced and reduced to possession at the well head. 9 At
that point the physical gas acquired by the lessee belongs to him alone. In
such a case the royalty owner has no gas of which to dispose and can thus
make no sale, in interstate commerce or otherwise. It is clear, therefore,
that in both ownership and non-ownership states, the lessee owns full title
when the gas reaches the well head.
It has been contended that these property concepts are determinative
of the question of FPC jurisdiction; that since no sale is or can be made
by the royalty owner within the purview of the Natural Gas Act, he is
free from regulation under the Act. It is vigorously asserted under this
view that the receipt of money royalties by the lessor does not constitute a sale of gas in interstate commerce, and that a mere debtor-creditor
relationship exists between the lessor and the owner of the working
interest of all gas sold. This reasoning further asserts that nothing more
exists than an agreement for the payment of money which is part of the
consideration for the lease, together with the rights conveyed thereby."
The weakness of these arguments is simply that under basic oil and gas
law, royalty is a reserved property interest retained by the mineral owner
under his lease, entitling him to a share of the proceeds from the sale of
gas. 1 The reservation of royalty in a lease then, is something more than an
agreement for the payment of money as part of the consideration for the

lease and rights conveyed thereby.
The federal decisions have refused to accept the no-title concept as controlling. One of the earliest manifestations of this occurred in a case involving depletion allowance. It is recognized for tax purposes that the

royalty owner has an interest in produced gas upon which he can claim
the depletion allowance. The depletion allowance accrues only to persons
having an "economic interest" in the mineral as produced. In order to
qualify as an economic interest the source of the income to the taxpayer
must be the extraction and sale of the mineral, and not the sale of the

mineral in the ground. The Supreme Court, in the landmark case of
Palmer v. Bender, 2 swept away all technicalities of title in upholding
the royalty owner's claim to depletion allowance and stated that:
2 Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 260 S.W.2d 676 (1953); Parker v. Standard Oil Co., 250
S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952), error ref. n.r.e.
2 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW § 203.1 (1964).
"0See Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932), holding that both the bonus paid and the
royalties to be paid under a lease constitute part of the consideration for the lease, and that this is
true whether the lease is located in a state that accepts or one that rejects the doctrine of ownership
in place.
" Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. 2d 110, 43 P.2d 788 (1935); Eternal Cemetery Corp. v. Tammen,
324 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), error ref. n.r.e.; Sheppard v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.,
125 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), error ref.; Sheffield v. Hogg, 124 Tex. 290, 77 S.W.2d
1021 (1934); Everett, The Executive Right To Lease, 3 RocKY MT. LAW INST. 509, 510 (1957);
Masterson, A Survey of Basic Oil and Gas Law, 4TH OIL & GAS INST. 219 (Southwestern Legal
Foundation 1953).
32287 U.S. 551 (1933).
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[T]he lessor's right to a depletion allowance does not depend upon his
retention of ownership or any other particular form of legal interest in the
mineral content of the land. It is enough if by virtue of the leasing transaction he has retained a right to share in the oil produced. If so he has an
economic interest in the oil, in place, which is depleted by production. Thus,
we have recently held that the lessor is entitled to a depletion allowance on
bonus and royalties, although by the local law ownership of the minerals,
in place, passed from lessor upon the execution of the lease. 3
The view that local concepts of property law are not controlling for
tax depletion purposes is equally true in the application of the Natural
"
Gas Act. In United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co. (hereinafter referred to as the Rayne Field case) the Supreme Court rejected,
as controlling, technical concepts of local law where they have the effect
of crippling or disabling the purpose of a regulatory statute. The Rayne
Field case involved a sale of leasehold interests in a substantially proven
and developed gas field. The lease-sale transaction was consummated
while the gas was in the ground and before a cubic foot thereof had
moved in interstate commerce. The consideration for such sale of leases
was measured by a lump-sum price as distinguished from a price per
MCF payable on production. In essence, the transaction was that commonly referred to in the gas industry as "a sale of gas reserves in place."
The Supreme Court had no difficulty in determining that such transaction constituted a "sale" of natural gas "for resale in interstate commerce" under the Natural Gas Act.3" The attitude of the Court was made
apparent when it stated: "A regulatory statute such as the Natural Gas
Act would be hamstrung if it were tied down to technical concepts of
local law."' In discussing the transaction in the Rayne Field case the
Supreme Court went on to state:
But it is perfectly clear that the sales of these leases in Rayne Field, a
proven and substantially developed field, accomplished the transfer of large
amounts of natural gas to an interstate pipeline company for resale in other
States. That is the significant and determinative economic fact. To ignore it
would be to undercut Phillips, and because of it the Commission . . . acted
properly in treating these sales of leasehold interests as sales of natural gas
within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act. 7
Thus it is abundantly clear that for a substantial period of time the
Supreme Court frequently has disregarded local concepts of property law
in decisions affecting federal regulatory statutes.
C. The Royalty Owner as a Natural Gas Company
From a standpoint of literal statutory construction it is somewhat difficult and incongruous to characterize a gas royalty owner as a natural
'id.

at 557.

34381 U.S. 392 (1965).
" The Court pointed out that despite the form of the transaction, "[t]he sales of leases here
involved were, in most respects, equivalent to conventional sales of natural gas which unquestionably
would be subject to Commission jurisdiction under Phillips Petroleum v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672."
Id. at 401.
l Id. at 400.
31Id. at 401.
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gas company, or as a person engaged in the sale of natural gas in interstate commerce for resale.3" In this connection, it can be stated with certainty that the legislative history of the Natural Gas Act reveals that no
consideration was given at any time to the matter of regulating the royalty owner by virtue of the sale of his share of gas produced."
In reaching the ultimate determination of whether or not the Federal
Power Commission has jurisdiction over gas royalty payments, it seems
clear that there must first be a judicial finding that the transaction of the
royalty owner does or does not constitute a "sale for resale" or interstate
transportation and that the royalty owner is or is not, in fact, classified
as a natural gas company within the meaning of the Act. Just as the oil
industry in general as well as those learned in the field of natural gas
regulation could not visualize that it was ever the intention of Congress
to regulate arms length sales by independent producers of natural gas, °
neither was it suspected that Congress intended, in passing the Natural
Gas Act, to exercise control over the payment of gas royalty. It would be
naive, nevertheless, to ignore the fact that statutory interpretation and
legislative intent are always matters over which the minds of men differ. "1
It is ironic indeed that sixteen years elapsed after the enactment of the
Natural Gas Act before the judicial determination in Phillips I that the
independent natural gas producer was a "natural gas company" within
the meaning of the Act. It will very likely require something in excess
of thirty years before there is a final judicial determination as to whether
the Federal Power Commission can, in its administration of the Natural
Gas Act, regulate royalty payments on gas sold for resale in interstate
commerce. If an affirmative determination of jurisdiction ever is made,
one can be sure that reliance on neither the recorded legislative history
of the Act nor the intent of Congress will be a critical factor in arriving
at the result.
The royalty owner's interest for the most part, has never been included
in the wide and ever-expanding range of regulatory activities carried on
by the Federal Power Commission. As pointed out in Denman, the historical fact is that the FPC has not as a matter of policy asserted jurisdiction
over gas royalty payments and as a consequence its own administrative
regulations and practices provide no machinery for passing on the question of payments of royalty made by the producer to its lessor.'
'8 15 U.S.C. 5 717a (6)

(1964).

39DeVane, Highlights of Legislative History of the Federal Power Act of 1935 and the Natural
Gas Act of 1938, 14 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 30 (1945).

40 See text accompanying notes 45-60 infra.
" For a striking example of this see the differing views expressed by Justices Frankfurter and
Douglas in Phillips I, over the same statutory language contained in the Natural Gas Act. It was
Douglas' view that the Act was not intended to regulate producer sales to pipelines and that this
was manifested in the language of section 1 (b) of the Act, exempting the production and gathering
of natural gas from regulation. 347 U.S. 672, 688 (1954). Frankfurter, on the other hand, maintained that the basic purpose of the Natural Gas Act was to occupy the field in which the states
could not act. In his separate opinion concurring with the majority, Frankfurter emphasized that
section 1(b) must not be construed on its face, but as though Congress had added language to
take care of producer sales since they were constitutionally not subject to state regulation. Id. at
685-86.

42 367 F.2d at 118.
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On the rare occasions where "in kind" royalty owners have been permitted to make rate filings in connection with sales to an interstate pipeline company, the Commission has acknowledged that such gas is subject to its jurisdiction.' This was vigorously protested by Commissioner
Digby, on the ground that royalty interests are non-jurisdictional since
section 1 (a) of the Natural Gas Act covers only the "business of transporting and selling natural gas. ..."
The mere ownership of royalty does not in itself bring a person under
the Act, but produced royalty gas could conceivably do so. Opponents of
jurisdiction forcefully argue that the land owner holding a royalty interest does not engage in any activities subject to or even mentioned in the
Natural Gas Act, in that he neither produces, transports, nor sells any
part of the production." It is clear that the typical royalty owner is not
actively engaged in the producing, gathering or transporting of the gas.
It is somewhat less than certain, however, that the royalty owner is not,
at least indirectly, engaged in the sale of gas production. Assuming the
royalty owner is subject to the Natural Gas Act, then the correct procedure is for the Federal Power Commission to assume jurisdiction over
matters relating to royalty on production subject to the Act.
The present unsettled controversy of FPC jurisdiction over the royalty
owner is somewhat similar to the situation which once existed with respect to the independent producer, who, until the 1954 decision in
Phillips I, was exempt from regulation under the Natural Gas Act. At
this stage the royalty owner indeed finds himself in the same challenged
position as the producer once did.
It is clear that the Natural Gas Act makes no distinction between "natural gas companies" which are independent producers, those which are
royalty owners, and those which are interstate pipelines. At the same time
under the authority given it under section 16 of the Act, the Commission
"may classify persons and matters within its jurisdiction and prescribe
different requirements for different classes of persons or matters." The
Commission did so after Phillips I, in its Order 174, defining an "Independent Producer." 7 The Supreme Court in that case made the sweeping
statement that:
We believe that the legislative history indicates a congressional intent to
give the Commission jurisdiction over the rates of all wholesales of natural
gas in interstate commerce, whether by a pipeline company or not and
whether occurring before, during, or after transmission by an interstate
pipeline company. There can be no dispute that the overriding congressional
purpose was to plug the "gap" in regulation *of natural gas companies re43See letters from Federal Power Commission to Elk River Coal & Lumber Co., and to Northern
Natural Gas Producing Co., both dated Aug. 30, 1956, reprinted in 6 OIL & GAs RPT.. 538
(1956).
"4Id. at 541.
'J.M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104, 113 (5th Cir. 1966).
46 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1964).
47 18 C.F.R. § 154.91 (1954): "'Independent Producer' Defined.-An 'Independent Producer'
as that term isused in thispart means any person as defined in the Natural Gas Act who isengaged
in the production or gathering of natural gas and who sells natural gas in interstate commerce
for resale, but who is not engaged in the transportation of natural gas by pipeline in interstate
commerce."
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sulting from judicial decisions prohibiting, on federal constitutional
grounds, state regulation of many of the interstate commerce aspects of the
natural gas business.48
The Court, with reasoning that astounded the oil and gas industry, held
that a sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale was not such
a part of "production or gathering" as to fall within the "production
or gathering" exemption contained in section 1 (b) of the Act. 9
Under the compulsion of this high court decision the Commission had
no alternative but to proceed to discharge its statutory duties and issued
the first of its orders in the "174 series."" ° This series of orders recognized and regulated the independent producer who sells natural gas
which moves out of the state in which it is produced, regardless of
whether the sale takes place at the well head, in the course of gathering,
or at the outlet of a processing plant.5"
On the current question of jurisdiction over royalty due under a lease,
however, the Commission is now actively seeking a basis for jurisdiction
instead of having it thrust on it by the courts. Such a shift is occurring
in spite of the fact that for many years the FPC has made no effort to
regulate royalty owner gas. The first indication of a possible change in the
long-standing posture of the Commission on this question was reflected
in the amicus curiae brief5" filed in Denman and Weymouth, in which a
majority of the Commission expressed the cautious but tentative view
that it is "arguable" that the Commission does have jurisdiction over
such royalties. Subsequently, the FPC staff filed a brief in connection
with hearings before the Commission on the question, arguing vigorously in support of such jurisdiction. 5
In July of 1968 the Commission's presiding examiner rendered his initial decision," holding that the royalty owners were natural gas companies as defined in the Act and that no additional filing requirements were
required for the present, other than the filing of an application by a
royalty owner seeking an increase in his royalty payment over and above
the existing rate in force. In effect, the examiner found that the provisions of the Act apply to persons entitled to royalty payments for sales
of gas which is under FPC jurisdiction and that such royalty payments
are subject to jurisdiction of the Commission under the Act. 5
The main thrust of the royalty owners' opposition to Commission
jurisdiction was simply that the royalty owner is not the owner of any
of the gas produced and therefore has nothing to sell. In disposing of
" Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 682 (1954).
41Id. at 677.
5019 Fed. Reg. 4535, 5081, 6301, 8809 (1954).
5 See, e.g., Op. No. 284 and order issued in Deep South Oil Co., 14 F.P.C. 83 (1955),
reported in 4 OIL & GAS RPTR. 1865 (1955).
" Memorandum for the Federal Power Commission, Amicus Curiae Brief, and Separate Views
of Commissioner L.J. O'Connor, Jr., J.M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1966),
Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966).
' Denman v. J.M. Huber Corp., No. R167-113 (F.P.C., Apr. 1, 1968).
54Denman v. J.M. Huber Corp., No. R167-113 (F.P.C., Presiding Examiner's Initial Decision
on Jurisdiction over Royalty Owners, July 23, 1968).
55Id.at 23.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 23

this argument the examiner concluded that the issue of jurisdiction must
be determined under the provisions of the Act, regardless of the parties'
rights and obligations under state law. Relying on United Gas Improveinent Co. v. Continental Oil Co.," he further emphasized that an "attractive gap" in Commission jurisdiction cannot be created by framing
contractual arrangements, designed to exclude jurisdictional gas from
regulation. 7 The royalty owners, the examiner noted, made no attempt to
claim, nor could they claim, that the gas itself was not in interstate commerce. He then reasoned:
By the terms of the lease the royalty owner has a continuing interest in
production as the payment flows from acquisition by interstate pipeline of
gas for resale for ultimate public consumption. The lessee must account to
the lessor for his share of the volumes of gas produced and compensate the
lessor for his retained fraction of the production. The effect is the same as
a conventional sale of gas by the lessor to the lessee. To hold that the Commission does not have jurisdiction would defeat the purpose of the Act by a

failure to plug a "gap" in the regulation of natural gas. 8

The examiner, pointing out that the market price for gas in the unregulated market is higher than allowed under regulation by the Commission, noted that the consumer has a real interest in royalty owner
attempts to force higher royalty rates than those filed in producer rate
schedules. In view, therefore, of the uncertainty of the price to be paid
for the royalty interest on the large volumes of gas moving in interstate
commerce and its direct effect on the price paid by the ultimate consumer, he concluded that, "the Commission must now exercise its jurisdiction to insure the reasonableness of price for gas to the consumer.""
Regardless of any assertion of jurisdiction by the FPC, it is to be expected that the Supreme Court will ultimately be called upon to dispose
of this matter. Whether a result similar to that reached in Phillips I by
the Supreme Court in extending jurisdiction over the producer will result is difficult to say with any degree of assurance. It is by no means
inconceivable that a similar outcome will occur, with history repeating
itself, in view of the Supreme Court's consistent record of expanding FPC
jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act at every opportunity. The numerous judicial decisions relating to FPC jurisdiction over the natural
gas business since Phillips I indicate that while the Natural Gas Act does
not always specifically cover every particular transaction, the courts have
frequently and liberally interpreted the Commission's implied powers to
deal with so called "utility action inimical to the consumer interest."" ° The
decisions have encouraged the Commission to decide cases more in the
light of claimed practical realities of regulation in the consumer interest, instead of letting itself be guided by the strict literal meaning of
statutory language.
5' 381 U.S. 392 (1965).
" Denman v. J.M. Huber Corp., No. R167-113 (F.P.C., Presiding Examiner's Initial
Decision
on Jurisdiction over Royalty Owners, July 23, 1968).
58Id. at 17 (emphasis added), citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
5
1Id. at 19.
"°Public Scrv. Comm'n v. FPC, 327 F.2d 893, 897 (D.C, Cir. 1964),
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THE DOCTRINE

OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

A. The Basic Doctrine
Even though a claim is properly before a court in a matter within its
power to adjudicate, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction determines
whether the court or the agency should first pass on some question or
some aspect of a question arising in the proceeding before the court. A
determination by a court that an agency has primary jurisdiction does
not mean that the court will decline to decide a case within its jurisdiction. It does mean that the court will postpone its action until after the
agency has made a designated determination. The original proceeding before the court may be continued after the agency has acted. The Supreme
Court has said of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction: "Court jurisdiction is not thereby ousted but only postponed." 1
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction differs from the exclusive jurisdiction doctrine in that the latter rule applies where a claim is cognizable
for trial by an administrative tribunal exclusively by virtue of the legislative selection or creation of the agency to promulgate and enforce
some declared policy of the legislature. The Supreme Court has concisely summarized the objective of these respective doctrines:
The very purpose of providing either an exclusive or an initial and preliminary administrative determination is to secure the administrative judgment either, in the one case, in substitution for judicial decision or, in the
other, as foundation for or perchance to make unnecessary later judicial
proceedings. 2
The principal reason behind the primary jurisdiction doctrine is recognition that there is a need for an orderly and sensible coordination of
the work of the agencies and of the courts. Whether the agency happens to be expert or not, it is plain that a court should not act on a
matter that is within the agency's particular field without due consideration of what the agency can contribute toward the court's adjudication
of the controversy. Otherwise parties that are subject to the agency's continuous regulation may become the victims of uncoordinated and conflicting requirements."3
In a 1958 decision" the Supreme Court, in a sound application of the
rule, held that an agency had primary jurisdiction to determine the legality of practices, but this did not imply that the agency's determination
was final. Instead, said the Court:
The holding that the Board had primary jurisdiction, in short, was a device to prepare the way, if the litigation should take its ultimate course, for
a more informed and precise determination by the Court of the scope and
meaning of the statute as applied to those particular circumstances."5
61

United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353 (1963).

62Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 767 (1947).
633 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 19.01, at 5 (1958).
64Federal

Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958).

65 Id. at 498-99.
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B. Basis and Development of the Doctrine
Essentially, the primary jurisdiction doctrine is one which allocates the
decisional process affecting issues in a lawsuit between the jurisdiction of
the particular administrative agency involved and that of the court. It
transfers from court to agency the power to determine some of the incidents of such relations." This is a doctrine that is concerned with promoting proper relationships between the courts and administrative agencies entrusted by Congress with particular regulatory duties."7 It is distinguished from the rule which requires exhaustion of administrative
remedies before resort to the courts, in that "exhaustion" applies where
a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency
alone, while "primary jurisdiction" applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts, but certainly not on an exclusive basis. " In
reality, primary jurisdiction comes into play whenever enforcement of the
claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,
have been placed within the special competence of an administrative
body. In such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its views." Its precise function
is to guide a court in determining whether the court should refrain from
exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has resolved some question or an aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court."0 Thus the basic reason behind the doctrine is recognition of the need for orderly and sensible coordination of the work of
agencies and of the courts.71
Development of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been almost
exclusively judicial rather than legislative."2 It began early in the twentieth
century as a creation of the Supreme Court in a case where, ironically
enough, the parties had not relied upon it and where considerations involving the construction of statutes would ordinarily have dictated a
conclusion different from that arrived at by the Court. In the landmark
case of Texas &€ Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. 3 the cotton oil
shipper sued the carrier in a state court to recover excess charges. The
Interstate Commerce Act permitted a person claiming to be damaged by
a common carrier to either make a complaint to the Commission or to
bring suit for the recovery of damages in any district or circuit court of
the United States.' 4 The Act further provided that nothing in the Act
abridged or altered the remedies existing at common law or by statute,
but the provisions of the Act were in addition to such remedies.' In
06

See Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered: The Anti-T-rust Laws, 102 U. PA. L.

REV. 577,

584 (1962).

"United

States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956).
1 ld. at 63-64.
69 General Am. Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422, 433 (1940).
0
' K. DAVIS, supra note 63, § 19.01, at 3.
1

Id. at 345.
7 von Mehren,

The Anti-Trust Laws and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine of Primary

Jurisdiction, 67 HAv. L. REV. 929, 930 (1954).
73204 U.S. 426 (1907).
7424 Stat. 379, 382 (1887).
7524 Star. 379, 387 (1887).
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spite of the fact that these provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act
unquestionably seemed to provide for a choice of remedies in the shipper,
either to proceed in the courts or seek reparation in the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Court said that the Commission was invested with
power originally to entertain proceedings for the alteration of an established schedule."0 The Court then asserted that if an agency was effectively
to exercise the regulatory functions which the Congress had conferred
upon it, it must have primary jurisdiction, even in the face of statutory
provisions preserving the judicial remedy. Any other result would destroy
the uniformity which is essential to the effective operation of a regulatory
scheme." It is to be noted that the rationale of the Supreme Court in its
unanimous determination, in this piece of judicial legislation to prevent
discordant court and agency conclusions from destroying the objectives
of the regulatory statutes, clearly did not place any explicit reliance on
expertness as the controlling consideration.
In the year immediately following there was a series of decisions involving rates and services which applied Abilene in terms of the statutory
requirement of uniform treatment." Thus, the earlier cases laid emphasis
on the desirable uniformity which would prevail if a specialized agency
initially passed on certain types of administrative questions."
Subsequently the doctrine took on a more elaborate dimension and
justification. This is demonstrated in later decisions which particularly
stressed, as a basis for primary jurisdiction, the expert and specialized
knowledge of the agencies involved." The rationale is that the courts will
not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to the decision of that
question by the administrative tribunal where (1) the question demands
the exercise of administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, or where (2) a uniformity of ruling
is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered." These two factors are basically parts of the same principle:
[T]hat in cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience
of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies
created by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed
over. This is so even though the facts, after they have been appraised by specialized competence, serve as a premise for legal consequences to be judicially
defined. Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted
76204 U.S. at 448.
"Id. at 440.
7' Midland Valley R.R. v. Barkley, 276 U.S. 482 (1928); Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 230 U.S. 304 (1913); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. United States, 215 U.S. 481 (1910).
" 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 789 (1962).
'0 United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959); United States v. Western Pac.
R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956); Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); Order of
Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 (1946); Kavanaugh v. Underwriters Life Ins. Co., 231
S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950), error ref. (the Board of Insurance Commissioners with its
actuaries, auditors, and other experts possessed of technical knowledge is eminently qualified to
determine the issues herein involved and is clothed with ample authority to grant to the plaintiffs
all of
8 1 the relief which they seek).
Annot., 1 L. Ed. 2d 1596 (1957).
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to a particular agency are secured, and the limited functions of review by
the judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies
that are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained
through experience and by more flexible procedure."2

The courts, mindful of the continuing evolution and expansion of this
relatively young doctrine, have not attempted to fix a precise formula
for its application: "In every case the question is whether the reasons for
the existence of the doctrine are present and whether the purposes it serves
will be aided by its application in the particular litigation.""3
C. A Comparison of Primary Jurisdiction with the Doctrine
of Abstention
The primary jurisdiction doctrine finds an interesting parallel in another established legal rule generally referred to as the doctrine of "abstention" from the exercise of jurisdiction. There are interesting similarities in the two doctrines despite the completely different purpose that
each serves. To better understand the working of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, it is necessary to examine the doctrine of abstention.
Essentially "abstention" contemplates that legal controversies involving
unsettled questions of state law may be decided in state tribunals before
a federal court's consideration of certain underlying federal questions.
Usually these are questions of a constitutional nature, 4 but not always is
this the case. " Under this rule the decision of a federal court is deferred
until a potentially controlling state law issue has been put to rest in the
state court. 8"
Just as primary jurisdiction is appropriately applied when a court genuinely thinks it is not in a position to evaluate a relevant issue in a claim
properly before it, abstention recognizes that federal courts do not decide
certain federal questions on the basis of preliminary guesses or conjectures
regarding local law."
The leading case first establishing the abstention doctrine was Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co."s This was an action to enjoin the enforcement
of a regulation of the Texas Railroad Commission requiring railroads
within the state to have an employee with the rank of conductor in
charge of each Pullman sleeping car." In addition to the federal constitutional question which the case presented, there was here a substantial
question of state law as to whether the Texas statute gave the Commission
E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952).
"United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956).
4
City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639, 640 (1959).
85 As to "abstention" in non-constitutional questions, see; e.g., Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v.
First Nat'l Bank, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964), where the court
of appeals en banc invoked the abstention doctrine in a diversity case. See also Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940); Green v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 119 F.2d 466 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 637 (1941); Lauderdale Co. v. Foster, 23 F. 516 (C.C. Tenn. 1885).
"United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134, 135-36 (1962).
"'Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944).
8Far

"8 312 U.S. 496 (1941).

" The regulation was attacked as an undue discrimination against Negroes, who were classed
as porters rather than conductors.
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power to make the order in question. The Court ordered the trial court
to abstain from deciding the case but to retain jurisdiction until the par-

ties had an opportunity to obtain from the state court a decision on the
state issues involved. In this way, the state questions were left for the

state courts to decide and the federal court avoided deciding a federal
constitutional question prematurely or unnecessarily. If the state tribunal

were to hold the Commission order invalid as a matter of state law, there
would be no need for the federal court to pass on the federal question.
The Court recognized:
In this situation a federal court of equity is asked to decide an issue by
making a tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow by a state
adjudication . . . . The resources of equity are equal to an adjustment that
will avoid the waste of a tentative decision as well as the friction of a premature constitutional adjudication."°
Ever since the Pullman doctrine was announced, the Supreme Court
on many occasions has ordered abstention where state courts were thought
to be more appropriate for resolution of complex or unsettled questions
of local law. The Court "has increasingly recognized the wisdom of staying actions in the federal courts pending determination by a state court
of decisive issues of state law.""1
The doctrine of abstention involves a discretionary exercise of a court's
equity powers and is not an automatic rule applied in every case where the

federal court is faced with a doubtful issue of state law." When properly
invoked it does not, in any sense, involve a withdrawal of federal jurisdiction but only a deferral of its exercise. In complying with the rule in
Erie v. Tompkins, 3 which held that the law to be applied in any case
dealing with questions of general law is the law of the state, abstention, if
the "special circumstances" prerequisite to its application exist,94 needs
only to be invoked once, pro hac vice. Once exercised, it is up to the
state courts to decide, or refuse to decide," unsettled questions of state
law before the federal courts will proceed to settle the controversy.
Abstention has been described as a "judge fashioned vehicle for according appropriate deference to the respective competence of the state
and federal court systems."" Similarly primary jurisdiction is concerned
with ensuring that a court, confronted with problems within an agency's
specialized field, have the benefit of whatever contributions the agency,
in its competence, can make to the solution of the controversy.
0 312 U.S.

at 500.

9' Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27 (1959).
92Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964).
'3304 U.S. 64 (1938).
94377 U.S. at 375.
" It should be noted at this point that there is a lack of accord among the courts as to their
jurisdiction to determine an unsettled question of state law after remission of a case by the federal
court under the abstention doctrine. One state, Louisiana, has given an advisory opinion to the
United States Supreme Court as a natter of courtesy. See Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California Co.,
241 La. 915, 132 So. 2d 845 (1961). A Florida statute empowers the supreme court of that state
to adopt rules for answering questions of state law certified to it by federal appellate courts. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1961). However, the Texas supreme court has refused to decide an
issue remitted to it on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to render an "Advisory Opinion."
United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965).
" Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959).
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A characteristic feature of the cases invoking the abstention doctrine
is that the federal court, in remitting the state issue to the state courts,
retains jurisdiction over the federal action and does not dismiss it. The
federal court does not preclude itself from deciding a question of state
law; it merely postpones its decision until the parties have had a reasonable opportunity to have questions of state law adjudicated in the state
tribunals.
As the Court has said on several occasions in applying the abstention
doctrine, "this principle does not, of course, involve the abdication of
federal jurisdiction, but only the postponement of its exercise; it serves
the policy of comity inherent in the doctrine of abstention; and it spares
the federal courts of unnecessary constitutional adjudication."'" It is
readily apparent that the doctrine of abstention is grounded on the need
for due regard for the respective competence of the state and federal
court systems. Similarly under primary jurisdiction, a like regard for the
specialized field of an agency designated by the legislature is equally important in maintaining a proper relationship between the court and the
agency. On this basis the courts will not decide a controversy within
its jurisdiction prior to the decision of the agency where the question
demands the exercise of administrative expertise.
D. Questions of Pure Law and Primary Jurisdiction
Most of the early cases established the principle that the primary jurisdiction doctrine had no application to a question which, while properly
determinable by an administrative tribunal, did not involve a question
of fact, but one of pure law determinable apart from the exercise of
administrative discretion, and where the required uniformity of determination was attainable otherwise than by confining determination of the
question to the administrative tribunal."
One of the early significant developments of this aspect of the doctrine
took place in 1922 in Great Northern R.R. v. Merchants Elevator
Co." where a shipper billed corn from points in Iowa and Nebraska to a
point in Minnesota at which it was inspected and then rebilled to its ultimate destination. The tariff rate from the points of origin via the point
of inspection to the ultimate destination was the same as to the point of
inspection alone. Under a railroad rule there was a charge of five dollars
per car for reconsignment but the charge was not applicable to grain
held for inspection and disposition orders incident thereto at the billed
destination. The question presented was whether an order for recon" Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959); accord England v. Louisiana Med. Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29
(1959).
"W.P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 299 U.S. 393 (1937);
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Brady, 288 U.S. 448 (1933); Texas & Pac. R.R. v. Gulf, C. & S.F.R.R.,
270 U.S. 266 (1926); Great Northern ER. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922);
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sonman Shaft Coal Co., 242 U.S. 120 (1916); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Puritan
Coal Mining Co., 237 U.S. 121 (1915); Louisville & Nashville ER. v. F.W. Cook Brewing Co.,
223 U.S. 70 (1912).
9259 U.S. 285 (1922).

1969]

ROYALTY

OWNER-PRIMARY JURISDICTION

signment after inspection was a "disposition order incident" to consignment. The Supreme Court held that a preliminary resort to the Interstate Commerce Commission for its decision is not essential where only a
question of law is presented and no fact is in controversy. The Court
reasoned that there was no occasion for the exercise of administrative
discretion since the task to be performed was only to determine the meaning of words of the tariff which were used in their ordinary sense and
to apply that meaning to the undisputed facts. It was the view of the
Court that Abilene did not apply because the construction of a writing
when "the words of a written instrument are used in their ordinary
meaning" presented solely a question of law,"° and that indeed every
question of the construction of a tariff is deemed a question of law.' In
the instant case, Mr. Justice Brandeis concluded: "Here no fact, evidential or ultimate, is in controversy; 2and there is no occasion for the exer1
cise of administrative discretion.
Probably the best judicial statement of the primary jurisdiction doctrine and its applicability is found in the opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan
in the case of United States v. Western Pacific R.R."'0 The controversy in that case arose over the rates to be applied to shipments of steel
aerial bomb cases filled with napalm gel, an inflammable but not selfigniting mixture. The railroads contended that the rates established for
"incendiary bombs" should be applied. The Government argued that a
different tariff rate should apply and that even if this tariff classification
were held to govern, the tariff would be unreasonable as applied to the
shipments. As to this issue it urged that the court proceeding should be
suspended and the matter referred to the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Court of Claims entered summary judgment for the railroads,
holding that the incendiary bomb rate applied. The Supreme Court,
however, on its own motion, decided that insofar as the initial construction of a tariff may rest on cost or other "transportation" factors, the
question was for the Commission.'" The Court concluded here that the
question of tariff construction, as well as that of the reasonableness of the
tariff as applied, were initially matters for the Commission's determination. The majority opinion by Justice Harlan explained that the primary
jurisdiction doctrine is applicable, particularly where litigation presents
issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges and requires the exercise of administrative discretion. In such cases "agencies
created
, , 1 by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed
over. 05
There has been criticism of the manner in which the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was expanded in Western Pacific and its companion
case, United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.° One noted authority
10

Id. at 291.
'0'Id. at 290.
101Id. at 294.
0'352 U.S. 59 (1956).
104Id. at 69.

101Id. at 64.
0'352 U.S. 77 (1956).
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argues that the courts "for years have been deciding cases of this sort
without any sense of strain and without any complaint from the Com-

mission and suddenly there is an urge for the perfect answer."'' 7 He
points out that the "function of interpreting specific tariffs is not central
to carrier regulation, while the Commission is overwhelmed with many
more far-reaching and important tasks.""'

This authority further asserts

that the expense and frustration of conducting two proceedings is an
unfortunate consequence of the Western Pacific and Chesapeake & Ohio
decisions."" The trend toward expanding the primary jurisdiction doctrine
nevertheless continues at a steady pace, with the courts emphasizing the
flexibility of the doctrine."'
The primary jurisdiction doctrine, correctly utilized, should not apply
where only a question of pure law is involved and determinable apart
from the exercise of administrative discretion. It is apparent, however,
that some "questions of law," in the sense of questions which a court
will consider on judicial review of agency action, come within the matters which a court will remit to agency determination under the primary
jurisdiction rule. In at least one instance this manner of enlarging the
doctrine to embrace questions of law has been expressly approved by the
Supreme Court."' This case involved an action against a water carrier to
recover for loss occasioned by the sinking of a barge and cargo which was
towed and berthed by the carrier. The carrier contended that an exculpatory clause in the contract for towage service and bill of lading covering
the barge movement released it from liability. The court of appeals ruled
that the clause was not invalid as a matter of law and should not be
held void until the parties had proceeded administratively to have it set
aside by the Interstate Commerce Commission."' The Supreme Court upheld this ruling."' The Court rightly assumed that the question whether
the exculpatory provisions of a tariff filed by a carrier with the ICC
offend against public policy is appropriate for judicial rather than administrative resolution, but "that does not mean that the courts must therefore deny themselves the enlightenment which may be had from a consideration of the relevant economic and other facts which the administrative
agency charged with regulation of the transaction here involved is pe'
culiarly well equipped to marshall and initially to evaluate.""
Another controversial extension of the primary jurisdiction rule arose
7
"0Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1046 (1964).
".Id. at 1044.
109Id. at 1045.
""' The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is flexible, and we should shape it and, if necessary,
strain it to fit the peculiar posture of this case in order to reach a practical accommodation of
court and agency." United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867, 883
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). "The outstanding feature of the doctrine is properly said to be its flexibility
permitting the courts to make a workable allocation of business between themselves and the agencies." Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Modern Air Transp., Inc., 179 F.2d 622, 625 (2d Cir. 1950).
The flexibility of the rule of primary jurisdiction is its chief distinction from the rule of exclusive
jurisdiction. See McAllister, Statutory Roads to Review of Federal Administrative Orders, 28 CALIF.
L. REV. 129, 150 (1940).
"' Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River, 360 U.S. 411 (1959).
"' River Terminals Corp. v. Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co., 253 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1958).
"3360 U.S. at 420.
114Id. at 421.
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in Carter v. American Tel. & Tel. Co."' where the rule was invoked
with respect to a serious antitrust question. This was a civil antitrust
action by Carter against certain telephone companies for triple damages
and injunctive relief based on the telephone companies' requirement prohibiting their subscribers from dealing with the Carter phone unit. The
plaintiff charged that some twenty-eight telephone companies,"' as part
of a common design or scheme, uniformly published a regulatory tariff
permitting the companies to suspend or terminate service if the device
was connected with the telephone company facilities. The plaintiff argued
that this was a wrongful use of such tariff to accomplish a violation of
the antitrust laws. The federal district court held that primary jurisdiction of the matter was vested in the FCC to resolve all questions relating
to the justness, reasonableness, validity and effect of the tariff and practices complained of, and stayed the proceedings pending conclusion of
appropriate administrative proceedings."' The Fifth Circuit affirmed this,
ruling that the question whether the practice required by the tariff in
effect is lawful is a matter for the FCC to decide since the range of its
power over regulated companies extends to "charges and practices" and
is not limited to rates and services."' This case furnishes a very questionable application of primary jurisdiction to pass on the issue of an antitrust
violation, in spite of the fact that a closely regulated industry is involved.
Although a so-called "pervasive regulatory scheme" is in force here in
that the Communications Act of 1934"' has established extensive controls, including the regulation of rates and practices over telephone and
telegraph companies, the undeniable fact remains that the exemption and
immunity from the antitrust law provided by the legislature in the Act
is limited to consolidations and mergers." Other than this narrow exception, the Act neither confers antitrust immunity on such companies
nor commits the determination of antitrust issues to the Federal Communication Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed this in United
States v. Radio Corp. of America,' with the following statement: "Thus,
the legislative history of the Act reveals that the Commission was not
given the power to decide antitrust issues as such, and that Commission
action was not intended to prevent enforcement of the antitrust laws in
federal courts.""'
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit in Carter approached the matter complained about as simply presenting a tariff construction problem involving "largely technological consideration as to the equipment, appa1
ratus, etc., reasonably within the tariff's description.""'
2
In the court's
view the sanctity of the tariff and its lawfulness were the crucial issue.
"'365 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1966).

"' Id. at 489-90.
17Carter v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 250 F. Supp. 188 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
118365 F.2d at 499 n.25.
1947 U.S.C. § 151-609 (1964).
12047 U.S.C. §§ 221(a), 222(c)(1)
"'. 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
121Id. at 346.

' 365 F.2d at 498.

(1964).
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In view of the particulars of this case where numerous telephone companies published and enforced a tariff preventing the use of a device such
as the Carter phone, the paramount and decisive issue is not, as the appellate court ruled, merely whether the practice permitted by the tariff was
lawful, but whether or not a conspiracy existed in violation of the antitrust laws.
Under such circumstances, as the Court stated in United States v. Radio
'
Corp. of America, 24
it is equally clear that courts retained jurisdiction
to pass on alleged antitrust violations irrespective of Commission action.
The FCC, therefore, has no authority to examine the legality of such
a conspiracy and in permitting it to do so the antitrust laws were, for all
practical purposes, superseded because of a mistaken fear that otherwise
the tariff structure might be thrown out of balance and sporadic action
by federal courts might work mischief.'
The problem in indiscriminate use of the primary jurisdiction doctrine
in antitrust matters is that it exaggerates the competency of the agency
in matters where the courts should retain jurisdiction to pass on alleged
antitrust violations. Continued extension of the doctrine in such cases
has the effect of "shifting the controlling standards of legality away from
court-administered antitrust emphasis on competition to wide-open administrative discretion to give up competition whenever such action is
deemed consistent with the public interest.""
A recent sobering measure of restraint, however, on the indiscriminate
extension of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction occurred in the Supreme
Court's decision in the case of Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea
Co. 2 In this case the local unions representing virtually all the butchers
in the Chicago area agreed with a trade association of Chicago food retailers that food store meat departments would be open only from 9 A.M.
to 6 P.M., Monday through Saturday. Faced with a strike unless it agreed
to these terms Jewel Tea signed the contract and then sued the union and
the trade association, seeking invalidation under the Sherman Act of the
marketing hours provision. The Court took the position that the union
did not violate the antitrust laws, inasmuch as the marketing hours
restriction was so intimately related to wages, hours and working conditions that the bona fide, arms length bargaining for such a provision, not
in combination with a non-labor group, was exempt from the Sherman
Act. In so holding Justice White stated that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, which if applicable would require resort to the NLRB for
determination of the issue whether an operating hours restriction is a
term or condition of employment," was inapplicable. Justice White
pointed out that the courts are not without experience in classifying bargaining subjects as terms or conditions of employment. Further, admonished the Court, "the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not a doctrine
124 358 U.S. at 343-44.
'2 365 F.2d at 499.
"' Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of

Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARv. L. REv. 436, 469 (1954).
127381 U.S. 676 (1965).
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of futility; it does not require resort to an expensive and merely delaying
administrative proceeding when the case must be eventually decided on a
controlling legal issue wholly unrelated to determination' ' 8 of the ascertainment of which the proceeding was sent to the agency. 11
E. Summary
can be a valuable tool in a proper case.
jurisdiction
rule
The primary
When not used to advantage, however, to obtain and appraise factual
information and other background through the appropriate regulatory
body, a decision by judges who are unequipped for making an evaluation
of the data may lead to a result by the court entirely different from that
of the agency on the same fact situation. Thus a case might well have two
different outcomes depending on whether handled by the agency or by
the court.
The possibility of this is most strikingly pointed out in the majority
opinion written by Justice Frankfurter in the Standard Stations29 case.
The case involved a question of whether exclusive supply contracts made
by Standard Oil Company of California with independent dealers in
petroleum products and auto accessories violated the Clayton Act. Section 3 of the Clayton Act prohibits such contracts where their effect may
be to substantially lessen competition.
The Supreme Court, in concluding that this practice violated the Clayton Act, ruled that all that was necessary in the way of a showing of the
actual or potential lessening of competition was proof that the contracts
covered a substantial number of outlets and a substantial number of
products, whether considered on a comparative basis or not.' The case
turned on the point that competition had been foreclosed in a substantial
share of the market.
What is revealing about this case is the Court's awareness that various
tests of the economic usefulness or restrictive effect of these exclusive
supply contracts could be relevant in determining whether the effects
of this arrangement "may be to substantially lessen competition."''.
Among these tests would be evidence that competition flourished despite
the use of the contracts, the determination of the status of the seller as a
newcomer or an established competitor, and probably most important,
the degree of market control.
In declining to apply these tests the Court acknowledged that any
judicial determination of the economic effect of the contracts would be
pure speculation on its part. It was cognizant that this type of data was
ill-suited for ascertainment by the courts and might result in an appraisal
of economic issues entirely different from that of the designated agency." 2
In this connection Justice Frankfurter made the following observation:
The dual system of enforcement provided for by the Clayton Act must
have contemplated standards of proof capable of administration by the
12

Id. at 686.
.. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
'"Id. at 314.
' 3 'Id. at 308.
'"Id. at 310.
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courts as well as by the Federal Trade Commission and other designated
agencies .... Our interpretation of the Act, therefore, should recognize that
an appraisal of economic data which might be practicable if only the latter
were faced with the task may be quite otherwise for judges unequipped for
it either by experience or by the availability of skilled assistance."'

The dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson in Standard Stations viewed it
as unfortunate that the Clayton Act submits such economic issues to

judicial determination, noting that the "judicial process is not well adapted
to exploration of such industry-wide, and even nation-wide, questions.""' 4
In effect it can be seen that the violation of the Clayton Act is based
solely on the Court's determination that the contracts in question covered
a substantial number of outlets and a substantial number of products and
that this automatically caused a lessening of competition. The proof
required by the Court, therefore, was one of quantity and not of quality.
A fair determination as to whether the "forbidden quality" was present
in violation of the Act required a hearing of all relevant evidence from
both sides and a weighing of that evidence as to the effects of the device.
What is important about Standard Stations is the realization that the
outcome of the case might well have been the opposite had the FTC been
assigned the task of determining, on a comparative basis, the practical
effect of such exclusive supply contracts on competition. The trial court
would not allow the defendant to show that such detrimental effects did
not flow from this arrangement, and the evidence that was admitted on
this subject was not considered in reaching the decision that the contracts
were illegal. The FTC by virtue of its specialization in this area was particularly well qualified to conduct such an investigation to determine, for
example, whether the number of Standard's competitors had increased or
decreased since its utilization of the requirements-contract system,
whether the number of its dealers had increased or decreased, as well as
other matters which would have shed light on the comparative status of
Standard and its competitors before and after the inauguration of that
system. The Court confronted with such economic issues should have had
the advantage of the contributions which this agency could make under
the circumstances.
By way of summarizing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as it has
developed and exists at this time, the following principles appear to
control:
(1) The claim must be originally capable of adjudication in the courts
rather than in the administrative forum, but at the same time the enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under the regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of the
administrative agency.
(2) Courts should not determine a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to the
decision of that question by the administrative tribunal where (a) the
's Id.

14Id. at 322.
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question demands the exercise of administrative judgment requiring the
special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal
to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, or (b) a uniformity
and consistency of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the
regulatory statute administered.
(3) In applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction the question is
whether the reasons for the existence of the doctrine are present and
whether the purposes it serves will be aided by its application in the particular litigation. The doctrine applies particularly where litigation presents issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges or in
cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion. This is so even
though the facts, after they have been appraised by an administrative
agency having special competence, serve as a premise for legal consequences to be judicially defined.
(4) The primary jurisdiction doctrine is not designed to divide or
allocate law-making powers between the courts and agencies, but only to
determine which tribunal shall take initial action and not which shall
act finally.
(5) Where an issue of law only is involved, application of the doctrine
generally can be characterized in contemporary terms as a "one shot
proposition," and once a ruling has been established there is no need to
repeat it in each succeeding situation. Where, however, a mixed fact and
law situation exists, or a fact issue only, it may well be necessary to repeat it.
IV. THE CONFUSION OF PRIMARY WITH EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
UNDER THE NATURAL GAS ACT
As an outgrowth of the litigation over royalty payments, the primary
jurisdiction question became the subject of a prolonged full-scale hearing
before the Federal Power Commission. Regrettably, however, the courts as
well as the Commission have apparently confused the primary jurisdiction
rule with that of exclusive jurisdiction. It is apparent that there has been a
failure under recent royalty claims to recognize that if jurisdiction exists
in the Commission at all under the Natural Gas Act, it is exclusive not
primary.
A. Assertion of Primary Jurisdiction in Royalty Litigation
Primary administrative jurisdiction as an issue in gas royalty litigation
was first injected by the defendant-lessee in the trial court in Denman" as
a defense to the claim made by the lessors for damages resulting from
the lessee's failure to pay for the royalty gas at the alleged market price
instead of the lesser price actually paid. The defendant contended that
the federal district court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter
because primary administrative jurisdiction was vested in the Federal
Power Commission under the Natural Gas Act and thus the plaintiff's
royalty gas and defendant's working interest gas were subject to the
" Denman v. J.M. Huber Corp., 251 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Tex. 1964).
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Natural Gas Act. The district court denied the lessee's claim that the FPC
had jurisdiction. On appeal the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
judgment as to all but the FPC primary jurisdiction point. Finding that
it

was at least arguable that primary jurisdiction under the Natural Gas

Act is in the Federal Power Commission, it held that the parties must
first proceed in the Commission for determination of the jurisdictional
question.'
It is interesting to note that at no time in the course of this litigation

was the question of whether the Federal Power Commission had exclusive
jurisdiction over gas royalty, rather than primary jurisdiction, ever
decided by the court, despite the fact that in the lower court the defendant claimed, among other points, that, "(3)

plaintiff's royalty gas and

defendant's working interest gas were and are subject to the Natural Gas
Act, and plaintiffs were and are not entitled to more than the price their
gas sales have on the only market for such gas permitted under the Natural Gas Act.""'
It is apparent that no party in Denman was willing to fully argue the
fundamental law on this issue. The FPC was seemingly content to argue
primary jurisdiction, but the real issue, that is whether the power of the
FPC to regulate the price paid for royalty gas transported and sold for
resale in interstate commerce is exclusive, has never been decided by the
court. This is a significant issue because rate-making by the agency is an
inherent function entrusted to it by Congress under the Natural Gas Act.
The assumption of jurisdiction is the assumption of rate-making and
someone must take on this responsibility of jurisdiction. It is simply not
possible for both the courts and the agency to act as rate-makers. It is
because of this fact that recognition of the true nature of the Federal
Power Commission's jurisdiction of the matter is of such critical importance.

The FPC memorandum filed in Deninan demonstrates a distinct historical reluctance by the Commission to exercise jurisdiction over the
royalty gas, even in the face of its tentative views that jurisdiction arguably exists."' This reluctance by the Commission to assume the rate-

making responsibility, coupled with the courts' failure to make a determination that jurisdiction is in the FPC, has needlessly held up and delayed
the litigation in Denman and Weymouth, as well as in the other pending
suits much longer than necessary under the circumstances. It would have
been far better had the court in these cases made its own determination as
to whether jurisdiction was in the Commission, rather than requiring the
Commission to carry on an extensive and time consuming investigation
and evaluation of this issue. The consequences of the court's approach
to reaching a solution will necessarily involve proceedings that are inordinately protracted and costly to the litigants. It is most disturbing, therefore, that the Fifth Circuit, in remanding Denman to the trial court,
186

J.M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104, 12'0 (5th Cir. 1966).

"7 251 F. Supp, at 748 (emphasis

added).
Memorandum for the Federal Power Commission, Amicus Curiae Brief, and Separate Views
of Commissioner L.J. O'Connor, Jr., J.M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1966).
136
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directed it to defer further action pending a ruling from the FPC on the
question of its jurisdiction and the status of the royalty owner's transaction under the Natural Gas Act."'
In Denman and Weymouth, the court of appeals was undoubtedly
persuaded by the view of the Federal Power Commission which urged,
albeit hesitantly, that since it is "arguable" that the matter of power
over royalty payments is within its jurisdiction, both the question of
jurisdiction, and if that exists, the appropriateness of the exercise of such
power, are matters for primary jurisdiction referral to the FPC for initial
decision. In doing so in Denman it relied on several National Labor Board
cases" where it was held that the courts must yield to the Board's jurisdiction whenever a labor dispute is arguably subject to the jurisdiction
of the NLRB. " Just what constitutes the test for an arguable case has

never been judicially established. The concept is unquestionably vague
and seems to require the mere presence of some broad basis for contend-

ing or asserting, without the necessity of actual proof, that jurisdiction
exists. What is more important to note here, however, is that the "arguably" cases cited by the FPC in its amicus curiae brief and relied upon by
the court were not primary jurisdiction cases at all but exclusive jurisdiction situations arising under the National Labor Relations Act.' The
cases cited applied San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon'" which
had held earlier that the proper administration of the federal labor law
requires the state courts to relinquish jurisdiction not only over those
controversies actually found to be within the jurisdiction of the NLRB,
but also over litigation arising from activities which might arguably be
subject to that agency's power to determine. The Court in Garmon concluded that only such a rule will obviate the danger of state interference
with national policy.'"
Unlike the labor cases cited by the Fifth Circuit in which it was the
court and not the agency that decided the Labor Board had jurisdiction
or at least arguably had jurisdiction, the court in both Denman and Weymouth chose to send the whole fundamental question to the FPC and let
it determine if it had jurisdiction over gas royalties. This indeed was a different and, as the court understated in Denman, "a new application of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.'' 1..
The court in Denman and Weymouth requested the FPC to file an amicus brief on the question of its jurisdiction and, in response, received a
formal memorandum that expressed the views not merely of its legal staff,
but those of the Commission itself. Thereafter, in order to get the fullest
possible exposure of views on the issue, the court invited all parties to submit unlimited comments, replies and rejoinders. In response to this, at least
1 367 F.2d at 121.
.'.See J.M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104, 112 n.25 (5th Cir. 1966).
141Id. at 112.
'4229 U.S.C. § 151-634 (1964).
143359 U.S. 236 (1959).

'14Id. at 245.
14' 367 F.2d at 111.
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fourteen memorandum briefs were filed." Even though it was armed with
such an array of advocatory arguments and views, the court in handing
down its decision was unwilling to do more than "set forth the respective
contentions of the protagonists and illumine the problem 1by
'4 7 factors, pro
and con, which might, or might not, have some relevance.
Once it had mistakenly accepted the "arguable basis for jurisdiction"
concept urged by the FPC in' its amicus brief, the court then reasoned
that it was in a position where it should not, on its own initiative, resolve
the issue of whether Commission jurisdiction did or did not exist. The
court was simply content to set forth what it characterized as the "powerful arguments" of the parties for and against jurisdiction, directing that
the FPC rule on the coverage of the statute since it was at least arguable
that jurisdiction existed. In doing this the court abdicated its judicial role
over the determination of a basic question of law and as a consequence
the litigation will be needlessly long and drawn out. The fact is that Denman was never an "arguably" problem as were the labor cases cited by the
court.'48 The special rule for preserving for the Labor Board its congressionally delegated function of deciding what is and what is not within
its domain should never have been applied to a fundamental question of
law as to basic jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act, which the court
is equally well equipped to answer.
It is troubling to see that, after having the benefit of the views of the
Commission upon which to render a decision, the court still felt compelled
to obtain an administrative ruling by this same Commission as to its jurisdiction. Such a duplication of effort required by the court of the agency
makes for a most expensive and delaying administrative proceeding. When
employed in this manner, primary jurisdiction tends to become ineffectual
and useless. The Supreme Court indicated its opposition to such application when it stated in Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co. that "the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not a doctrine of futility; ...."'"
B. The Mechanics of Applying Primary Jurisdiction in the Denman Case
In view of the court's conclusion in Denman that the FPC "arguably"
has primary jurisdiction over gas royalty payments where the producer is
involved in a jurisdictional sale, it seems desirable to describe or at least
endeavor to describe the mechanics of what may be expected to develop in
this aspect of the litigation.
In its decision the court directed the trial court to obtain a ruling by
the FPC as to the agency's jurisdiction and the status of the royalty interest owner's transaction as a sale under the Natural Gas Act. If answered
146Id.
147Id.

.48The NLRB decisions relied on in the instant case, 367 F.2d at 112 n.25, are distinguishable
from Denman in their holding that the proper administration of the federal labor laws requires that
labor disputes arising from activities which might arguably be subject to that agency's cognizance,
as well as those actually found to be within the jurisdiction of the NLRB, are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Board. Denman, on the other hand, involves the resolution of a far reaching
question of statutory power to exercise jurisdiction. Here is simply a question of law, as to whether
or not jurisdiction does in fact exist in the designated agency to regulate the royalty interest.
149381 U.S. 676, 686 (1965).
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in the affirmative, the Commission should then indicate how such jurisdiction should be implemented to insure Commission control over such
payments; that is, what method should be used in computing gas royalty
payments and what additional filing requirements, if any, should be imposed.
The Commission's recent assertion of jurisdiction over the payment of
royalties on jurisdictional gas was hardly unexpected, particularly in the
face of the FPC's historical disposition to follow the longstanding position of the Supreme Court in rejecting anything that would tend to create an50 "attractive gap" in Commission jurisdiction under the Natural Gas
1
Act.

While the Commission does not foresee any additional administrative
burden resulting from its assertion of gas royalty jurisdiction, it will have
to decide whether any additional regulations are needed. Even though the
lessor-lessee sale is jurisdictional, it may, nevertheless, not be necessary for
the royalty owners to make any filings with the Commission. A workable
precedent for this position is found in section 154.91 (d) of the regulations under the Natural Gas Act applicable to producers, which provides
that a non-signatory co-owner to a jurisdictional gas sales contract is not
permitted to file a certificate application or rate schedules in the absence
of a waiver for good cause.'
The royalty interest is similar in many respects to a percentage interest
held by an independent producer in a lease who is not a signatory to a gas
sales contract. The Commission's regulations do not presently provide for
separate filings by royalty owners who are not themselves signatory parties
to the gas sales contract.
The regulations cited above are typical of the Commission's practical
efforts to minimize the administrative burdens on the agency with respect
to its regulatory practices. It can be expected that the Commission will
continue its efforts to avoid the imposition of any additional filing requirements wherever feasible. It may well be that only in those instances where
the royalty owner seeks a higher price for his share of the gas over that
which the producer is authorized to receive will it be necessary for the
agency's processes to be invoked.'' The adoption by the Commission of
a regulation making a set proceeding applicable to all royalty owners
would seem to be appropriate for dealing with such situations.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is submitted that the attempted application of a rule such as the primary jurisdiction doctrine, which provides for the allocation of jurisdic"' See Denman v. J.M. Huber Corp., No. R167-113 (F.P.C., Opinion No. 562, July 23, 1968).
15 A similar approach is taken by the Commission under section 154.91 (e) of the regulations in
connection with percentage sales contracts between a producer and the operator of a processing
plant where the producer sells its gas to the plant operator at a price that is determined on the
basis of a percentage of the proceeds from the jurisdictional resale of the residue gas by the plant
operator. Under this regulation the producer is not permitted to make such filings. They are made
by the plant operator who must list the producers and their respective share of proceeds.
saa Denman v. J.M. Huber Corp., No. R167-113 (F.P.C., Presiding Examiner's Initial Decision
on Jurisdiction over Royalty Owners, July 23, 1968).
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tion over the substantive question of federal regulation over interstate gas
royalty payments, is erroneous in settling the fundamental question of
whether the Federal Power Commission has been granted jurisdiction by

Congress in the Natural Gas Act over royalties due under a lease where
the production has been sold in interstate commerce for resale. The fact
is that either the Commission has by statute the exclusive jurisdiction in
such cases, or it has no jurisdiction whatsoever, primary or otherwise.
In unmistakable terms, the Supreme Court in Phillips I held in 1954
that "the legislative history indicates a Congressional intent to give the
Commission jurisdiction over the rates of all wholesales of natural gas
in interstate commerce . . . ."" The bill on which the hearings were held
leading to the passage of the Natural Gas Act as introduced in Congress
provided in section 1 (b) for Commission jurisdiction over the sale of
1"
natural gas in interstate commerce "for resale to the public." " Similarly,
a "natural gas company" was defined in section 2 (5) as including a person
engaged in the sale of natural gas in interstate commerce "for resale to the
public.'. 1 The Natural Gas Act itself in plain and clear language manifestly sets forth the power of the Commission to perform all acts and prescribe the orders, rules and regulations that it may find necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Act."' It reposes exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal Power Commission through federal regulation in all
matters relating to the transportation and sale of natural gas in interstate
commerce, with a built-in statutory procedure for judicial review of a
claim of an aggrieved party. This statutory road to judicial review in the
Natural Gas Act." demonstrates the congressional intent that the Federal
Power Commission was to have original, paramount and exclusive jurisdiction with respect to those matters over which it had power, subject only
to the right of judicial review as prescribed in the statute.
In the field of banking regulation the Supreme Court has made this
same principle clear in its decision in Whitney National Bank v. Bank of
New Orleans."' This case involved a national bank which, in order to
avoid the restrictions of the federal banking laws as to branch banking,
resorted to a plan under which a holding company would organize a new
national bank. The existing bank would merge into that bank and the
holding company would also organize a new national bank. After the plan
was approved by the Federal Reserve Board, Louisiana enacted a statute
making it unlawful for a bank holding company to establish any new
banks. The plaintiffs, three state-chartered banks, filed a suit in the district court of the District of Columbia seeking a declaratory judgment
and injunctive relief to prevent the Comptroller of Currency from issuing a certificate of authority for the new bank. The Supreme Court ordered dismissal of the complaint, holding that the district court had no
15347 U.S.

672, 682

(1954).

154H.R. RLP. No. 4008, 75th Cong, 1stSess.22 (1937).
'5 Id. at 141-43.
150 15 U.S.C. S 717o (1964).
5 15 U.S.C. § 717r (1964).
5s 3 7 9 U.S. 411 (1965).
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jurisdiction to pass on the merits of the holding company proposal and
that appropriate disposition of the controversy could not be made without
further consideration of the effect of the Louisiana statute by the Federal
Reserve Board where original exclusive jurisdiction rested. The Court
held that where Congress has provided statutory review procedures designed to permit administrative agency expertise to be brought to bear on
particular problems, "those procedures are to be exclusive. . . . [T]o permit a district court to make the initial determination of a plan's propriety
would substantially decrease the effectiveness of the statutory design."''
If the foregoing, then, represents the applicable law existing today, the
only question remaining in the instant cases with respect to the royalty
gas is whether the royalty owner can be correctly classified as a natural
gas company making a sale in interstate commerce for resale, within the
meaning of the Natural Gas Act.
It is submitted that the function of the Commission and the statutory
scheme for judicial review laid out by Congress in the Natural Gas Act
will sustain a major defeat if the courts erroneously rule that the Federal
Power Commission merely has primary jurisdiction over this question.
Under such an umbrella of concurrent jurisdiction both the courts and
the agency would be attempting to adjudicate and dispose of claims for
royalty due.
With the question of "market value" of gas royalty payments pending
not only before the federal courts but the state courts as well under entirely independent claims, it is not difficult to foresee that such a diluted
form of overlapping jurisdiction will almost certainly have the effect of
establishing bad law. The effectiveness of that portion of the Natural Gas
Act which vests in the Commission the power to perform all acts and prescribe orders, rules and regulations that it finds necessary to carry out the
provisions of the Act, will be substantially decreased. On the other hand,
if exclusive and paramount jurisdiction is established in the Commission,
,'market value" will no longer be a consideration, but area rates based on
cost of service will fix the value of the gas through area pricing. It is
recognized, of course, that if the agency has no jurisdiction in any form
over gas royalty payments, the question of primary versus exclusive jurisdiction will become moot and of no consequence.
It is submitted that the judicial importance of the doctrine of exclusive
jurisdiction has been underestimated, with the courts failing to give sufficient attention to its application. There are matters which are committed
to administrative agencies which in the first instance are not within the
limits of the judicial power,'" just as there are matters which are within
the jurisdiction of the courts but not within the province of agencies.
Also, statutes may create rights which are enforceable only in the administrative and not in the judicial forum."' The administrative agencies
at 420 (emphasis added).
'Id.
.. Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v. Interlake S.S.Co., 370 U.S. 173 (1962);
Transit & Land Co. v. Hawaii, 211 U.S. 282 (1908); Hickey v. Stewart, 11 L.
161 E.g., Where Congress has created a special administrative procedure for the
the status of persons or companies under a regulatory act, and has prescribed a

Honolulu Rapid
Ed. 814 (1845).
determination of
procedure which
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have, not infrequently, been held to have exclusive jurisdiction of original
matters which precludes the institution of an original action in court with
regard to those matters. 6' This is particularly so where the legislation enacted by Congress provides for "final and conclusive" action by the
agency."'
Certainly those matters which are properly within the jurisdiction of
the administrative tribunals may and should be determined by administrative process. In this connection, if the legislature provides a remedy before an administrative agency which meets the demands of due process of
law and does not invade the constitutional jurisdiction of a court, then in
the absence of a clear indication of a contrary legislative intent, a court
may be deemed to have no jurisdiction in the premises."' The inevitable
impairment of the power granted to the agency which will result from
permitting suits in the courts initially is both a practical and justifiable
basis for prohibiting such judicial jurisdiction in the first instance.
The issue of agency jurisdiction over royalties arising in Denman and
Weymouth has brought into sharp focus the need to recognize that a clear
cut distinction does exist between the doctrines of primary and exclusive
jurisdiction. All too frequently the courts have been disposed to treat these
doctrines as synonymous, without any attempt to differentiate between
them.
It is indeed unfortunate that in Denman and Weymouth the court
chose to direct the Federal Power Commission to hold hearings and a lengthy investigation and make a legal determination on whether or not the
Natural Gas Act covers royalty payments, all for the purpose of aiding
the court in the final disposition of the claims before it. This unprecedented approach is a far cry and departure from the basic holding in Great
Northern that questions of interpretation are for the court itself, with
prior recourse to the designated agency only to resolve questions of fact.
Rather than pass the instant royalty matter to the FPC for a full scale inquiry and study, it would have been far better had the Fifth Circuit in
Denman and Weymouth either proceeded to order the trial court to fix
the actual market price of the gas, or held that the trial court had no
jurisdiction of the controversy by reason of the paramount and exclusive
jurisdiction of the FPC over such royalty payments. It is interesting that
Judge Brown in Denman did entertain this latter choice when he recognized that if "the amounts paid for royalty constitute a 'rate,' . . . then
primary jurisdiction is not only a matter of initial determination by the
administrative agency. Rather it then becomes the exclusive role of the
agency.
meets all the requirements of due process, that remedy is exclusive. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co.
v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
"'Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411 (1965); Pennsylvania R.R. v.
Day, 360 U.S. 548 (1959); T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959); Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub.
Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951); Order of Ry. Conductors v. Southern R.R., 339 U.S. 255 (1950);
Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 339 U.S. 239 (1950).
.. First Moon v. White Tail, 270 U.S. 243 (1926).
1" Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
's 367 F.2d at 120.
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Manifestly, the court was cognizant of the real consequences of a determination that royalty constitutes a "rate" within the meaning of the
Natural Gas Act, but because of reservations and doubt on its own disposition of the matter, the court would commit itself only to the submission to the agency, for initial decision, the question of agency jurisdiction
as a primary reference matter.
In conclusion it is submitted that the court appears to have incorrectly
handed over to the FPC, for initial determination and interpretation, the
question of jurisdiction, rather than deciding itself the fundamental legal
question as to whether administrative jurisdiction did in fact exist. The
novel application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine by the court is one
more step in the contemporary trend to make an otherwise good rule a
panacea in judicial-agency relationships. The courts would render a true
service in restricting the application of this useful tool to those situations
that properly call for it, and assume themselves, their proper judicial responsibilities when agency reference is not appropriate.

